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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Authoritarian intragovernmental relations: Devolution and executive power in Zimbabwe, with lessons from South Africa

Darryn Nyatanga

International Journal of Constitutional Law · 23.06.2026

DOI: 10.1093/icon/moag074 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Constitutional Law, online erschienen am 23.06.2026. Verfasst von Darryn Nyatanga. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Constitutional devolution is often assumed to constrain executive power, particularly in post-authoritarian and hybrid regimes. This article challenges that assumption by showing how decentralization can instead be adapted to entrench executive dominance. Drawing on Zimbabwe as the core case and South Africa as a carefully selected comparator, it develops the concept of authoritarian intragovernmental relations (AIGR) to explain why similar constitutional commitments to devolution produce divergent distributions of power in practice. The analysis demonstrates that the effectiveness of devolution depends not on constitutional text alone but also on how intragovernmental relations are structured, institutionalized, and enforced. It identifies four mechanisms through which devolution may be neutralized under authoritarian or hybrid conditions: constitutional façade building, where decentralization is proclaimed but not realized; fiscal chokeholds that maintain centralized control over resources; executive unilateralism enabled by weak or absent cooperation structures; and limited judicial oversight that diminishes the enforceability of constitutional obligations. Zimbabwe illustrates how these mechanisms can hollow out devolution without formal constitutional violation. South Africa, by contrast, shows how entrenched cooperation duties, fiscal frameworks, and judicial enforcement can transform decentralization into a site of contestation even under dominant-party rule. The AIGR framework offers a diagnostic tool for assessing when devolution constrains executive authority and when it instead legitimates its concentration.

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APA

Nyatanga, D. (2026). Authoritarian intragovernmental relations: Devolution and executive power in Zimbabwe, with lessons from South Africa. International Journal of Constitutional Law. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moag074

Vancouver

Nyatanga D. Authoritarian intragovernmental relations: Devolution and executive power in Zimbabwe, with lessons from South Africa. International Journal of Constitutional Law. 2026. doi:10.1093/icon/moag074

BibTeX
@article{Nyatanga2026,
  author = {Nyatanga, Darryn},
  title = {Authoritarian intragovernmental relations: Devolution and executive power in Zimbabwe, with lessons from South Africa},
  journal = {International Journal of Constitutional Law},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/icon/moag074}
}
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