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Gaps in deterrence theory and AI solutions

Daniel Sazhin, Tyler J Gandee, Christopher Stevens, Lorraine Borghetti

International Affairs · 09.11.2026 · 102 (6) · 2073-2101

DOI: 10.1093/ia/iiag162 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Affairs, online erschienen am 09.11.2026. Verfasst von Daniel Sazhin und 3 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Deterrence is a cornerstone of military strategy, yet its theoretical foundations, particularly the conflicting predictions of classical deterrence theory and perfect deterrence theory, lack the empirical validation required to develop effective AI-enabled decision aids. To address this limitation, we propose using experimental methods, primarily the mutual deterrence game (MDG), to rigorously test theoretical predictions and investigate how psychosocial factors like risk aversion and strategic reasoning (k-level thinking) influence human deterrence decisions. We also advocate leveraging the resulting empirical insights to inform the development of AI tools. We demonstrate through simulation that a reinforcement learning (RL) agent in an iterated MDG can successfully learn an adversary's preferences such as aversion to inequity, challenger gains or defender losses to model escalatory behaviour over time. Recognizing the limitations and inherent escalatory biases of autonomous AI, we contend that a human–machine co-learning framework is the most effective implementation. In this model, humans and AI, including RL and large language models, work interdependently to update beliefs, generate courses of action and model adversarial intent. This integrated research programme provides the necessary theoretical and technical architecture for creating advanced AI-enabled decision aids that can help policy-makers reduce the likelihood of conflict.

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APA

Sazhin, D., Gandee, T. J., Stevens, C., & Borghetti, L. (2026). Gaps in deterrence theory and AI solutions. International Affairs, 102(6), 2073-2101. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiag162

Vancouver

Sazhin D, Gandee TJ, Stevens C, Borghetti L. Gaps in deterrence theory and AI solutions. International Affairs. 2026;102(6):2073-2101. doi:10.1093/ia/iiag162

BibTeX
@article{Sazhin2026,
  author = {Sazhin, Daniel and Gandee, Tyler J and Stevens, Christopher and Borghetti, Lorraine},
  title = {Gaps in deterrence theory and AI solutions},
  journal = {International Affairs},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {102},
  number = {6},
  pages = {2073--2101},
  doi = {10.1093/ia/iiag162}
}
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