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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Serial patent litigation: an emerging strategy to delay entry of generic competition

Timothy Bonis, Aaron S Kesselheim iD, Sean Tu iD

Health Affairs Scholar · 01.12.2025 · 3 (12)

DOI: 10.1093/haschl/qxaf240 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Health Affairs Scholar, online erschienen am 17.12.2025. Verfasst von Timothy Bonis und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, United States. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 10 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Arnold Ventures, Commonwealth Fund.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The Hatch–Waxman Act of 1984 was designed to accelerate generic drug entry by establishing a framework for resolving patent disputes between brand-name and generic manufacturers. While the Act has facilitated competition and expanded the availability of affordable medicines, brand-name firms have increasingly exploited its procedural structure to delay or deter generic competition through “serial litigation.” This strategy involves filing successive, questionable lawsuits, often based on non-innovative continuation patents. Even if the brand ultimately loses, the delays and litigation costs can discourage generic firms from entering the market or compel them to settle on terms that undermine patients’ timely access to affordable generics. In the case of Astellas's overactive bladder drug mirabegron (Myrbetriq), after an initial Hatch–Waxman case settled in 2020 with generic entry expected in 2024, Astellas pursued 4 additional lawsuits, each built on new but substantively indistinguishable patents. These tactics have delayed broad competition, leaving only 2 firms to launch in 2024 under the threat of massive damages. Similar patterns are observed with other drugs, including bimatoprost (Latisse), aflibercept (Eylea), and tasimelteon (Hetlioz).

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

delaygeneric druglitigationpatents

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, United States.
  • Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL), Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics, Department of Medicine, Brigham and Women's Hospital, Boston, MA 02120, United States.
  • Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA 02115, United States.
  • University of Alabama School of Law, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487, United States.

ORCID-Profile: Aaron S Kesselheim, Sean Tu

Förderung

  • Arnold Ventures
  • Commonwealth Fund

Zitieren

APA

Bonis, T., Kesselheim, A. S., & Tu, S. (2025). Serial patent litigation: an emerging strategy to delay entry of generic competition. Health Affairs Scholar, 3(12). https://doi.org/10.1093/haschl/qxaf240

Vancouver

Bonis T, Kesselheim AS, Tu S. Serial patent litigation: an emerging strategy to delay entry of generic competition. Health Affairs Scholar. 2025;3(12). doi:10.1093/haschl/qxaf240

BibTeX
@article{Bonis2025,
  author = {Bonis, Timothy and Kesselheim, Aaron S and Tu, Sean},
  title = {Serial patent litigation: an emerging strategy to delay entry of generic competition},
  journal = {Health Affairs Scholar},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {3},
  number = {12},
  doi = {10.1093/haschl/qxaf240}
}
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