Avoiding the Coup-Proofing Dilemma: Consolidating Political Control While Maximizing Military Power
Foreign Policy Analysis · 01.06.2020 · 16 (3) · 312-331
DOI: 10.1093/fpa/oraa001 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Foreign Policy Analysis, online erschienen am 06.04.2020. Verfasst von Dan Reiter. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 13-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 105 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Civil-military relations scholarship forecasts that governments fearing coups d’état and facing belligerent external and internal adversaries face a dilemma. Governments can coup-proof to reduce coup risk, but such measures reduce military effectiveness. Conversely, if they eschew coup-proofing to maintain military effectiveness, they risk coups. This paper explains how governments facing coup threats and belligerent adversaries can alleviate this dilemma. It first describes five coup-proofing measures that generally reduce military effectiveness, such as politicized promotion and reduced training, and two other coup-proofing measures that do not reduce effectiveness, bribery and indoctrination. Because leaders can pick and choose which coup-proofing measures to employ, leaders facing coup and belligerent adversary threats can reduce the coup-proofing dilemma by adopting those coup-proofing measures that do not reduce effectiveness and avoiding those measures that reduce effectiveness, within availability and dependence constraints. The paper presents a case study of coup-proofing in Nazi Germany, a deviant case for coup-proofing theory and democratic victory theory because Adolf Hitler avoided being overthrown in a coup and fielded an effective military. The case study demonstrates support for the theory that a leader can simultaneously reduce coup risk and optimize military effectiveness by employing some coup-proofing tactics but not others.
Zitieren
APA
Reiter, D. (2020). Avoiding the Coup-Proofing Dilemma: Consolidating Political Control While Maximizing Military Power. Foreign Policy Analysis, 16(3), 312-331. https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/oraa001
Vancouver
Reiter D. Avoiding the Coup-Proofing Dilemma: Consolidating Political Control While Maximizing Military Power. Foreign Policy Analysis. 2020;16(3):312-331. doi:10.1093/fpa/oraa001
BibTeX
@article{Reiter2020,
author = {Reiter, Dan},
title = {Avoiding the Coup-Proofing Dilemma: Consolidating Political Control While Maximizing Military Power},
journal = {Foreign Policy Analysis},
year = {2020},
volume = {16},
number = {3},
pages = {312--331},
doi = {10.1093/fpa/oraa001}
}
EUVIMED