An Illusory Feeling of Stability: Bank Failures in France in the 1920s
European Review of Economic History · 10.11.2026 · 30 (4) · 746-784
DOI: 10.1093/ereh/heag022 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift European Review of Economic History, online erschienen am 28.07.2026. Verfasst von David Demilly. Die Arbeit nennt 56 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article uses historical data from French banks to document the sources of bank failures in France between 1918 and 1928. The analysis shows that failed banks faced liquidity rather than solvency constraints. Although banks exhibited high capital ratios, such ratios did not ensure stability and encouraged greater exposure to risky and illiquid activities. When losses materialized or repayment requests intensified, banks were forced to default. Conversely, banks’ holdings of readily available liquid assets are associated with a lower probability of failure, highlighting the protective role of liquidity buffers against adverse shocks.
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APA
Demilly, D. (2026). An Illusory Feeling of Stability: Bank Failures in France in the 1920s. European Review of Economic History, 30(4), 746-784. https://doi.org/10.1093/ereh/heag022
Vancouver
Demilly D. An Illusory Feeling of Stability: Bank Failures in France in the 1920s. European Review of Economic History. 2026;30(4):746-784. doi:10.1093/ereh/heag022
BibTeX
@article{Demilly2026,
author = {Demilly, David},
title = {An Illusory Feeling of Stability: Bank Failures in France in the 1920s},
journal = {European Review of Economic History},
year = {2026},
volume = {30},
number = {4},
pages = {746--784},
doi = {10.1093/ereh/heag022}
}
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