Tax Farming and State Capacity: Evidence from Colonial Indonesia
European Review of Economic History · 06.08.2026 · 30 (3) · 405-444
DOI: 10.1093/ereh/heaf023 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift European Review of Economic History, online erschienen am 21.04.2026. Verfasst von Mark Hup. Die Arbeit nennt 74 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
How did centralized fiscal institutions emerge? This study investigates the relationship between state capacity and tax farming—tax collection by private actors—in colonial Indonesia. To do so, I construct a new database that covers the transition from tax farming to state-run tax collection. The results indicate that state capacity expansion reduced reliance on tax farming and that different segments of the state bureaucracy differentially impacted the tax farming transition. Officials from the majority group largely excluded from tax farming (i.e., the indigenous) strongly reduced reliance on tax farming. In contrast, officials from the minority group traditionally wooed as tax farmers (i.e., the non-indigenous Asians) did not reduce such reliance. The findings provide evidence for centralized fiscal institutions emerging when the state becomes less dependent on divide-and-rule strategies that route revenue streams through politically weak intermediaries.
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APA
Hup, M. (2026). Tax Farming and State Capacity: Evidence from Colonial Indonesia. European Review of Economic History, 30(3), 405-444. https://doi.org/10.1093/ereh/heaf023
Vancouver
Hup M. Tax Farming and State Capacity: Evidence from Colonial Indonesia. European Review of Economic History. 2026;30(3):405-444. doi:10.1093/ereh/heaf023
BibTeX
@article{Hup2026,
author = {Hup, Mark},
title = {Tax Farming and State Capacity: Evidence from Colonial Indonesia},
journal = {European Review of Economic History},
year = {2026},
volume = {30},
number = {3},
pages = {405--444},
doi = {10.1093/ereh/heaf023}
}
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