War, Mobilization, and Fiscal Capacity: Testing the Bellicist Theory in Greece, 1833–1939
European Review of Economic History · 08.08.2025 · 29 (3) · 412-435
DOI: 10.1093/ereh/heaf004 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift European Review of Economic History, online erschienen am 16.04.2025. Verfasst von Andreas Kakridis. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 73 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Themen: Mobilisation
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Constructing a new dataset of Greek public revenues and expenditures (1833–1939), this paper finds that war mobilizations undermined tax revenues in the short run, but helped increase fiscal capacity in the long run. Taxes increased on the heels of major spikes in defense expenditures, even in cases where mobilizations did not escalate to war. But even in normal times, tax revenues responded more to additional military than civilian outlays. The paper thus provides evidence in support of bellicist theories of state formation for Greece while also proposing a new approach to testing the effects of war on fiscal capacity.
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APA
Kakridis, A. (2025). War, Mobilization, and Fiscal Capacity: Testing the Bellicist Theory in Greece, 1833–1939. European Review of Economic History, 29(3), 412-435. https://doi.org/10.1093/ereh/heaf004
Vancouver
Kakridis A. War, Mobilization, and Fiscal Capacity: Testing the Bellicist Theory in Greece, 1833–1939. European Review of Economic History. 2025;29(3):412-435. doi:10.1093/ereh/heaf004
BibTeX
@article{Kakridis2025,
author = {Kakridis, Andreas},
title = {War, Mobilization, and Fiscal Capacity: Testing the Bellicist Theory in Greece, 1833–1939},
journal = {European Review of Economic History},
year = {2025},
volume = {29},
number = {3},
pages = {412--435},
doi = {10.1093/ereh/heaf004}
}
EUVIMED