Anticipating the financial crisis: evidence from insider trading in banks
Economic Policy · 01.04.2020 · 35 (102) · 213-267
DOI: 10.1093/epolic/eiaa012 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economic Policy, online erschienen am 17.11.2020. Verfasst von Ozlem Akin und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness, European Research Council, European Union’s Horizon 2020.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Banking crises are recurrent phenomena, often induced by excessive bank risk-taking, which may be due to behavioural reasons (over-optimistic banks neglecting risks) and to conflicts of interest between bank shareholders/managers and debtholders/taxpayers (banks exploiting moral hazard). We test whether US banks’ stock returns in the 2007–8 financial crisis are associated with bank insiders’ sales of their own bank’s shares in the period prior to 2006Q2 (the peak and reversal in real estate prices). We find that top-five executives’ sales of shares predict bank performance during the crisis. Interestingly, effects are insignificant for the sales of independent directors and other officers. Moreover, the top-five executives’ impact is stronger for banks with higher exposure to the real estate bubble, where a one standard deviation increase of insider sales is associated with a 13.33 percentage point drop in stock returns during the crisis period. Finally, even though bankers in riskier banks sold more shares (furthering their own interests), they did not change their bank’s policies, for example, by reducing bank-level exposure to real estate. The informational content of bank insider trading before the crisis suggests that insiders knew that their banks were taking excessive risks, which has important implications for theory, public policy and the understanding of crises, as well as a supervisory tool for early warning signals.
Förderung
- Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness
- European Research Council
- European Union’s Horizon 2020
- Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
- Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D
Zitieren
APA
Akin, O., Marín, J. M., & Peydró, A. J. (2020). Anticipating the financial crisis: evidence from insider trading in banks. Economic Policy, 35(102), 213-267. https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiaa012
Vancouver
Akin O, Marín JM, Peydró AJ. Anticipating the financial crisis: evidence from insider trading in banks. Economic Policy. 2020;35(102):213-267. doi:10.1093/epolic/eiaa012
BibTeX
@article{Akin2020,
author = {Akin, Ozlem and Marín, José M and Peydró, and José-Luis},
title = {Anticipating the financial crisis: evidence from insider trading in banks},
journal = {Economic Policy},
year = {2020},
volume = {35},
number = {102},
pages = {213--267},
doi = {10.1093/epolic/eiaa012}
}
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