Free to Fail? Paternalistic Preferences in the United States
The Economic Journal · 29.10.2026
DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueag136 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 29.10.2026. Verfasst von Björn Bartling und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper examines paternalistic preferences in two large-scale experiments with participants from the US general population. Participants decide whether to intervene when a stakeholder is about to make a choice misaligned with the stakeholder’s own preferences. Willingness to intervene depends on which intervention is available: only a minority implements a hard intervention, which restricts the stakeholder’s choice set, while a majority implements a soft intervention that provides information without restricting choice. A substantial share of participants does not defer to the stakeholder’s stated preferences when evaluating welfare. Our framework estimates that about half are welfarists and a third libertarian paternalists.
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APA
Bartling, B., Cappelen, A. W., Hermes, H., Skivenes, M., & Tungodden, B. (2026). Free to Fail? Paternalistic Preferences in the United States. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueag136
Vancouver
Bartling B, Cappelen AW, Hermes H, Skivenes M, Tungodden B. Free to Fail? Paternalistic Preferences in the United States. The Economic Journal. 2026. doi:10.1093/ej/ueag136
BibTeX
@article{Bartling2026,
author = {Bartling, Björn and Cappelen, Alexander W and Hermes, Henning and Skivenes, Marit and Tungodden, Bertil},
title = {Free to Fail? Paternalistic Preferences in the United States},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/ej/ueag136}
}
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