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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Free to Fail? Paternalistic Preferences in the United States

Björn Bartling, Alexander W Cappelen, Henning Hermes, Marit Skivenes, Bertil Tungodden

The Economic Journal · 29.10.2026

DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueag136 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 29.10.2026. Verfasst von Björn Bartling und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper examines paternalistic preferences in two large-scale experiments with participants from the US general population. Participants decide whether to intervene when a stakeholder is about to make a choice misaligned with the stakeholder’s own preferences. Willingness to intervene depends on which intervention is available: only a minority implements a hard intervention, which restricts the stakeholder’s choice set, while a majority implements a soft intervention that provides information without restricting choice. A substantial share of participants does not defer to the stakeholder’s stated preferences when evaluating welfare. Our framework estimates that about half are welfarists and a third libertarian paternalists.

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APA

Bartling, B., Cappelen, A. W., Hermes, H., Skivenes, M., & Tungodden, B. (2026). Free to Fail? Paternalistic Preferences in the United States. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueag136

Vancouver

Bartling B, Cappelen AW, Hermes H, Skivenes M, Tungodden B. Free to Fail? Paternalistic Preferences in the United States. The Economic Journal. 2026. doi:10.1093/ej/ueag136

BibTeX
@article{Bartling2026,
  author = {Bartling, Björn and Cappelen, Alexander W and Hermes, Henning and Skivenes, Marit and Tungodden, Bertil},
  title = {Free to Fail? Paternalistic Preferences in the United States},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/ej/ueag136}
}
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