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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Disclosure in Insurance Markets with Limited Screening

Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Dimitri Migrow

The Economic Journal · 22.07.2026

DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueag092 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 22.07.2026. Verfasst von Andriy Zapechelnyuk und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We investigate the impact of information disclosure, via a statistical instrument, on consumer welfare in competitive insurance markets with limited screening. We demonstrate that, under natural constraints on information disclosure, no statistical instrument is “safe” to implement. There always exists a nonnegligible set of prior beliefs about the risk types of consumers, compatible with an observed market situation, under which additional information disclosure strictly worsens welfare.

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APA

Zapechelnyuk, A., & Migrow, D. (2026). Disclosure in Insurance Markets with Limited Screening. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueag092

Vancouver

Zapechelnyuk A, Migrow D. Disclosure in Insurance Markets with Limited Screening. The Economic Journal. 2026. doi:10.1093/ej/ueag092

BibTeX
@article{Zapechelnyuk2026,
  author = {Zapechelnyuk, Andriy and Migrow, Dimitri},
  title = {Disclosure in Insurance Markets with Limited Screening},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/ej/ueag092}
}
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