Disclosure in Insurance Markets with Limited Screening
The Economic Journal · 22.07.2026
DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueag092 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 22.07.2026. Verfasst von Andriy Zapechelnyuk und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We investigate the impact of information disclosure, via a statistical instrument, on consumer welfare in competitive insurance markets with limited screening. We demonstrate that, under natural constraints on information disclosure, no statistical instrument is “safe” to implement. There always exists a nonnegligible set of prior beliefs about the risk types of consumers, compatible with an observed market situation, under which additional information disclosure strictly worsens welfare.
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APA
Zapechelnyuk, A., & Migrow, D. (2026). Disclosure in Insurance Markets with Limited Screening. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueag092
Vancouver
Zapechelnyuk A, Migrow D. Disclosure in Insurance Markets with Limited Screening. The Economic Journal. 2026. doi:10.1093/ej/ueag092
BibTeX
@article{Zapechelnyuk2026,
author = {Zapechelnyuk, Andriy and Migrow, Dimitri},
title = {Disclosure in Insurance Markets with Limited Screening},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/ej/ueag092}
}
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