Politicians’ Social Welfare Criteria An Experiment With German Legislators
The Economic Journal · 21.05.2026
DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueag067 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 21.05.2026. Verfasst von Sandro Ambuehl und 4 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Much economic analysis derives policy recommendations based on social welfare criteria intended to model policymakers’ preferences. Yet, little is known about policymakers’ normative views suitable for this use. Our behavioural experiment elicits German legislators’ welfare criteria. When resolving preference conflicts across individuals, they place substantially more importance on least-favoured alternatives than on most-favoured alternatives, contrasting with common aggregation mechanisms and the equal weighting inherent in utilitarianism. When resolving preference conflicts within individuals, politicians choose inconsistently with behavioural economists’ most common approach to welfare analysis with time-inconsistent preferences. In distribution, politicians largely support the same welfare criteria as the public.
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APA
Ambuehl, S., Blesse, S., Doerrenberg, P., Feldhaus, C., & Ockenfels, A. (2026). Politicians’ Social Welfare Criteria An Experiment With German Legislators. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueag067
Vancouver
Ambuehl S, Blesse S, Doerrenberg P, Feldhaus C, Ockenfels A. Politicians’ Social Welfare Criteria An Experiment With German Legislators. The Economic Journal. 2026. doi:10.1093/ej/ueag067
BibTeX
@article{Ambuehl2026,
author = {Ambuehl, Sandro and Blesse, Sebastian and Doerrenberg, Philipp and Feldhaus, Christoph and Ockenfels, Axel},
title = {Politicians’ Social Welfare Criteria An Experiment With German Legislators},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/ej/ueag067}
}
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