Rotation, Performance Rewards and Property Rights
The Economic Journal · 10.11.2026 · 136 (680) · 2669-2704
DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaf126 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 27.11.2025. Verfasst von Weijia Li. Die Arbeit nennt 96 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: Helen Gan and Richard Aston Fellowship for China Studies, John L. Simpson Memorial Research Fellowship for Comparative Studies.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Economic growth needs a strong and well-functioning government. But a government too strong can dominate private firms, leading to a holdup problem that is especially severe in autocracies. This paper studies how to constrain local officials in autocracies through personnel rules, with a special focus on rotation and performance-based evaluation. Through a game-theoretic model, I show that rotation or performance evaluation alone makes the holdup problem even worse. But it is exactly their combination that covers each other’s weakness and solves the holdup problem together. Firm-level panel data from China are consistent with the key predictions of the model.
Förderung
- Helen Gan and Richard Aston Fellowship for China Studies
- John L. Simpson Memorial Research Fellowship for Comparative Studies
Zitieren
APA
Li, W. (2026). Rotation, Performance Rewards and Property Rights. The Economic Journal, 136(680), 2669-2704. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaf126
Vancouver
Li W. Rotation, Performance Rewards and Property Rights. The Economic Journal. 2026;136(680):2669-2704. doi:10.1093/ej/ueaf126
BibTeX
@article{Li2026,
author = {Li, Weijia},
title = {Rotation, Performance Rewards and Property Rights},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
year = {2026},
volume = {136},
number = {680},
pages = {2669--2704},
doi = {10.1093/ej/ueaf126}
}
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