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Employer Market Power in Silicon Valley

Matthew D Gibson

The Economic Journal · 11.08.2026 · 136 (678) · 2191-2223

DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaf109 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 15.10.2025. Verfasst von Matthew D Gibson. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 109 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Glassdoor.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Adam Smith alleged that employers often secretly combine to reduce labour earnings. This paper examines an important case of such behaviour: no-poaching agreements through which information-technology companies agreed not to compete for each other’s workers. Exploiting the plausibly exogenous timing of a US Department of Justice investigation, I estimate the effects of these agreements using a difference-in-differences design. Data from Glassdoor permit the inclusion of rich employer- and job-level controls. On average, the no-poaching agreements reduced salaries at colluding firms by 5.6%, consistent with considerable employer market power. Stock bonuses and job satisfaction were also negatively affected.

Förderung

  • W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
  • Glassdoor

Zitieren

APA

Gibson, M. D. (2026). Employer Market Power in Silicon Valley. The Economic Journal, 136(678), 2191-2223. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaf109

Vancouver

Gibson MD. Employer Market Power in Silicon Valley. The Economic Journal. 2026;136(678):2191-2223. doi:10.1093/ej/ueaf109

BibTeX
@article{Gibson2026,
  author = {Gibson, Matthew D},
  title = {Employer Market Power in Silicon Valley},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {136},
  number = {678},
  pages = {2191--2223},
  doi = {10.1093/ej/ueaf109}
}
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