Employer Market Power in Silicon Valley
The Economic Journal · 11.08.2026 · 136 (678) · 2191-2223
DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaf109 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 15.10.2025. Verfasst von Matthew D Gibson. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 109 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Glassdoor.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Adam Smith alleged that employers often secretly combine to reduce labour earnings. This paper examines an important case of such behaviour: no-poaching agreements through which information-technology companies agreed not to compete for each other’s workers. Exploiting the plausibly exogenous timing of a US Department of Justice investigation, I estimate the effects of these agreements using a difference-in-differences design. Data from Glassdoor permit the inclusion of rich employer- and job-level controls. On average, the no-poaching agreements reduced salaries at colluding firms by 5.6%, consistent with considerable employer market power. Stock bonuses and job satisfaction were also negatively affected.
Förderung
- W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
- Glassdoor
Zitieren
APA
Gibson, M. D. (2026). Employer Market Power in Silicon Valley. The Economic Journal, 136(678), 2191-2223. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaf109
Vancouver
Gibson MD. Employer Market Power in Silicon Valley. The Economic Journal. 2026;136(678):2191-2223. doi:10.1093/ej/ueaf109
BibTeX
@article{Gibson2026,
author = {Gibson, Matthew D},
title = {Employer Market Power in Silicon Valley},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
year = {2026},
volume = {136},
number = {678},
pages = {2191--2223},
doi = {10.1093/ej/ueaf109}
}
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