Polarisation and Public Policy: Political Adverse Selection under Obamacare
The Economic Journal · 30.08.2025
DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaf079 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 30.08.2025. Verfasst von Leonardo Bursztyn und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 38 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Kaiser Family Foundation.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Politicising policies designed to address market failures can diminish their effectiveness. We document a pattern of ‘political adverse selection’ in the health insurance exchanges established under the Affordable Care Act (colloquially, ‘Obamacare’): Republicans enrolled at lower rates than Democrats and independents, a gap driven by healthier Republicans. This selection raised public subsidy spending by approximately $155 per enrollee annually (3.2% of average cost). We fielded a survey to show that this selection does not exist for other insurance products. Lower enrolment and higher costs are concentrated in more Republican areas, potentially contributing to polarised views of the policy.
Förderung
- Kaiser Family Foundation
Zitieren
APA
Bursztyn, L., Kolstad, J., Rao, A., Tebaldi, P., & Yuchtman, N. (2025). Polarisation and Public Policy: Political Adverse Selection under Obamacare. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaf079
Vancouver
Bursztyn L, Kolstad J, Rao A, Tebaldi P, Yuchtman N. Polarisation and Public Policy: Political Adverse Selection under Obamacare. The Economic Journal. 2025. doi:10.1093/ej/ueaf079
BibTeX
@article{Bursztyn2025,
author = {Bursztyn, Leonardo and Kolstad, Jonathan and Rao, Aakaash and Tebaldi, Pietro and Yuchtman, Noam},
title = {Polarisation and Public Policy: Political Adverse Selection under Obamacare},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.1093/ej/ueaf079}
}
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