When Information is Not Enough: Evidence from a Centralised School Choice System
The Economic Journal · 07.01.2026 · 136 (673) · 26-60
DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaf046 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 13.06.2025. Verfasst von Kehinde F Ajayi und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 44 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We implemented a large-scale randomised controlled trial encompassing 900 junior high schools in Ghana, a country with universal secondary school choice, to study whether providing students and parents with information on school characteristics and selection strategies improved outcomes in a centralised school selection mechanism. Information changed households’ preferences and the characteristics of schools to which they applied. Students gained admission to higher value-added schools, yet they were not more likely to matriculate on time or at all. Incomplete school information was not the only friction. Household shocks and inaccurate preference forecasting likely contributed to continued admission deviations.
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APA
Ajayi, K. F., Friedman, W. H., & Lucas, A. M. (2026). When Information is Not Enough: Evidence from a Centralised School Choice System. The Economic Journal, 136(673), 26-60. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaf046
Vancouver
Ajayi KF, Friedman WH, Lucas AM. When Information is Not Enough: Evidence from a Centralised School Choice System. The Economic Journal. 2026;136(673):26-60. doi:10.1093/ej/ueaf046
BibTeX
@article{Ajayi2026,
author = {Ajayi, Kehinde F and Friedman, Willa H and Lucas, Adrienne M},
title = {When Information is Not Enough: Evidence from a Centralised School Choice System},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
year = {2026},
volume = {136},
number = {673},
pages = {26--60},
doi = {10.1093/ej/ueaf046}
}
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