Nudging for Tax Compliance: A Meta-Analysis
The Economic Journal · 26.04.2025 · 135 (668) · 1033-1068
DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueae088 ↗Kurz gefasst
Metaanalyse in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 03.10.2024. Verfasst von Armenak Antinyan und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 35-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 135 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Governments increasingly use nudges to improve tax collection. We synthesise the growing literature on nudging experiments using meta-analytical methods. We find that, relative to the baseline where about a quarter of taxpayers are compliant, simple reminders increase the probability of compliance by 2.7 percentage points, while tax morale and deterrence nudges increase compliance by an additional 1.4 and 3.2 percentage points. Our further results highlight the conditions where nudges are more or less effective. Overall, our findings imply that taxpayers are biased by various informational and behavioural constraints, and that nudges can be of some help in overcoming these frictions.
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APA
Antinyan, A., & Asatryan, Z. (2025). Nudging for Tax Compliance: A Meta-Analysis. The Economic Journal, 135(668), 1033-1068. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueae088
Vancouver
Antinyan A, Asatryan Z. Nudging for Tax Compliance: A Meta-Analysis. The Economic Journal. 2025;135(668):1033-1068. doi:10.1093/ej/ueae088
BibTeX
@article{Antinyan2025,
author = {Antinyan, Armenak and Asatryan, Zareh},
title = {Nudging for Tax Compliance: A Meta-Analysis},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
year = {2025},
volume = {135},
number = {668},
pages = {1033--1068},
doi = {10.1093/ej/ueae088}
}
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