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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Trust and State Effectiveness: The Political Economy of Compliance

Timothy Besley, Sacha Dray

The Economic Journal · 22.08.2024 · 134 (662) · 2225-2251

DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueae030 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 10.04.2024. Verfasst von Timothy Besley und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 30-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 72 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Horizon 2020.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper explores the link between trust in government, policymaking and compliance. It focuses on a specific channel whereby citizens who are convinced of the merits of a policy are more motivated to comply with it. This, in turn, reduces the government’s cost of implementing this policy and may also increase the set of feasible interventions. As a result, state effectiveness is greater when citizens trust their government. The paper discusses alternative approaches to modelling the origins of trust, especially the link to the design of political institutions. We then provide empirical evidence consistent with the model’s findings that compliance is increasing in government trust using the Integrated Values Survey and voluntary compliance during COVID-19 in the United Kingdom.

Förderung

  • Horizon 2020

Zitieren

APA

Besley, T., & Dray, S. (2024). Trust and State Effectiveness: The Political Economy of Compliance. The Economic Journal, 134(662), 2225-2251. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueae030

Vancouver

Besley T, Dray S. Trust and State Effectiveness: The Political Economy of Compliance. The Economic Journal. 2024;134(662):2225-2251. doi:10.1093/ej/ueae030

BibTeX
@article{Besley2024,
  author = {Besley, Timothy and Dray, Sacha},
  title = {Trust and State Effectiveness: The Political Economy of Compliance},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {134},
  number = {662},
  pages = {2225--2251},
  doi = {10.1093/ej/ueae030}
}
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