Decision Times Reveal Private Information in Strategic Settings: Evidence from Bargaining Experiments
The Economic Journal · 06.10.2023 · 133 (656) · 3007-3033
DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead055 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 24.07.2023. Verfasst von Arkady Konovalov und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 13-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 117 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
People respond quickly when they have a clear preference and slowly when they are close to indifference. The question is whether others exploit this tendency to infer private information. In two-stage bargaining experiments, we observe that the speed with which buyers reject sellers’ offers decreases with the size of the foregone surplus. This should allow sellers to infer buyers’ values from response times, creating an incentive for buyers to manipulate their response times. We experimentally identify distinct conditions under which subjects do, and do not, exhibit such strategic behaviour. These results provide the first insight into the possible use of response time as a strategic variable.
Zitieren
APA
Konovalov, A., & Krajbich, I. (2023). Decision Times Reveal Private Information in Strategic Settings: Evidence from Bargaining Experiments. The Economic Journal, 133(656), 3007-3033. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead055
Vancouver
Konovalov A, Krajbich I. Decision Times Reveal Private Information in Strategic Settings: Evidence from Bargaining Experiments. The Economic Journal. 2023;133(656):3007-3033. doi:10.1093/ej/uead055
BibTeX
@article{Konovalov2023,
author = {Konovalov, Arkady and Krajbich, Ian},
title = {Decision Times Reveal Private Information in Strategic Settings: Evidence from Bargaining Experiments},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
year = {2023},
volume = {133},
number = {656},
pages = {3007--3033},
doi = {10.1093/ej/uead055}
}
EUVIMED