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Pledge-and-Review Bargaining: from Kyoto to Paris

Bård Harstad

The Economic Journal · 20.03.2023 · 133 (651) · 1181-1216

DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueac076 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 09.11.2022. Verfasst von Bård Harstad. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 25-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 60 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

A tractable dynamic model of international climate policies is analysed. The choice of bargaining game influences participation levels, emission quotas and technology investment levels. I derive several predictions that are arguably consistent with the differences between the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement—including the transitioning from the former to the latter.

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APA

Harstad, B. (2023). Pledge-and-Review Bargaining: from Kyoto to Paris. The Economic Journal, 133(651), 1181-1216. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueac076

Vancouver

Harstad B. Pledge-and-Review Bargaining: from Kyoto to Paris. The Economic Journal. 2023;133(651):1181-1216. doi:10.1093/ej/ueac076

BibTeX
@article{Harstad2023,
  author = {Harstad, Bård},
  title = {Pledge-and-Review Bargaining: from Kyoto to Paris},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {133},
  number = {651},
  pages = {1181--1216},
  doi = {10.1093/ej/ueac076}
}
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