Technology-Neutral Versus Technology-Specific Procurement
The Economic Journal · 13.01.2023 · 133 (650) · 669-705
DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueac075 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 04.10.2022. Verfasst von Natalia Fabra und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 22-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 28 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: European Research Council, Horizon 2020 Framework Programme.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
An imperfectly informed regulator needs to procure multiple units of some good (e.g., green energy, market liquidity, pollution reduction, land conservation) that can be produced with heterogeneous technologies at various costs. How should she optimally procure these units? Should she run technology-specific or technology-neutral auctions? Should she allow for partial separation across technologies? Should she instead post separate prices for each technology? What are the trade-offs involved? We find that one size does not fit all: the preferred instrument depends on the costs of the available technologies, their degree of substitutability, the extent of information asymmetry and the costs of public funds. We illustrate the use of our theory for policy analysis with an ex ante evaluation of Spain’s recent renewable auction.
Förderung
- European Research Council
- Horizon 2020 Framework Programme
Zitieren
APA
Fabra, N., & Montero, J. (2023). Technology-Neutral Versus Technology-Specific Procurement. The Economic Journal, 133(650), 669-705. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueac075
Vancouver
Fabra N, Montero J. Technology-Neutral Versus Technology-Specific Procurement. The Economic Journal. 2023;133(650):669-705. doi:10.1093/ej/ueac075
BibTeX
@article{Fabra2023,
author = {Fabra, Natalia and Montero, Juan-Pablo},
title = {Technology-Neutral Versus Technology-Specific Procurement},
journal = {The Economic Journal},
year = {2023},
volume = {133},
number = {650},
pages = {669--705},
doi = {10.1093/ej/ueac075}
}
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