The contest between central bank digital currencies, stablecoins, and tokenized deposits: Which will likely win, and why?
Capital Markets Law Journal · 01.04.2026 · 21 (2)
DOI: 10.1093/cmlj/kmag012 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Capital Markets Law Journal, online erschienen am 01.04.2026. Verfasst von Ross P Buckley. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref). Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: Australian Research Council Laureate Fellowship.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
International payments are arguably the least efficient part of most financial systems and are thus ripe for disruption. Before 2025, central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) appeared to be the most likely vehicle for such disruption, given monetary systems are best built on the settlement finality of central bank money. This changed in 2025 with the support of the Trump Administration for stablecoins. There is now a contest between stablecoins, CBDCs and tokenized bank deposits to underpin international payments in the future. This article analyses the three different architectures and argues that tokenized deposits are the most likely to prevail longer term.
Förderung
- Australian Research Council Laureate Fellowship
Zitieren
APA
Buckley, R. P. (2026). The contest between central bank digital currencies, stablecoins, and tokenized deposits: Which will likely win, and why?. Capital Markets Law Journal, 21(2). https://doi.org/10.1093/cmlj/kmag012
Vancouver
Buckley RP. The contest between central bank digital currencies, stablecoins, and tokenized deposits: Which will likely win, and why?. Capital Markets Law Journal. 2026;21(2). doi:10.1093/cmlj/kmag012
BibTeX
@article{Buckley2026,
author = {Buckley, Ross P},
title = {The contest between central bank digital currencies, stablecoins, and tokenized deposits: Which will likely win, and why?},
journal = {Capital Markets Law Journal},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {2},
doi = {10.1093/cmlj/kmag012}
}
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