Putting Consent Back in Its Place, or the Double Social Meaning of Sex
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume · 03.07.2026 · 100 (1) · 233-255
DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akag009 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, online erschienen am 03.07.2026. Verfasst von Manon Garcia. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 37 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Contemporary analytic philosophy treats consent as the master concept of sexual ethics. This paper challenges that centrality on four fronts. First, consent-as-permission fails to capture the full range of sexual violations; the organizing moral problem is domination, not autonomy infringement. Second, rape law should be structured around perpetrator conduct and culpability, not the victim's consent status. Third, good sex is not merely permissible sex: its proper norm is consensus rather than permission. Finally, contemporary sexual culture sustains two competing regulative ideals—sex as shared agency and sex as dominance—and consent-talk obscures this conflict rather than resolving it.
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APA
Garcia, M. (2026). Putting Consent Back in Its Place, or the Double Social Meaning of Sex. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 100(1), 233-255. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akag009
Vancouver
Garcia M. Putting Consent Back in Its Place, or the Double Social Meaning of Sex. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. 2026;100(1):233-255. doi:10.1093/arisup/akag009
BibTeX
@article{Garcia2026,
author = {Garcia, Manon},
title = {Putting Consent Back in Its Place, or the Double Social Meaning of Sex},
journal = {Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume},
year = {2026},
volume = {100},
number = {1},
pages = {233--255},
doi = {10.1093/arisup/akag009}
}
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