Everything First
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume · 04.06.2023 · 97 (1) · 248-272
DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akad012 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, online erschienen am 04.06.2023. Verfasst von Errol Lord. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 43 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Normative theory aims to understand the commonalities between ethics, prudence, epistemology, aesthetics and political philosophy (among others). One central question in normative theory is what is fundamental to the normative. The reasons-first approach holds that normative reasons are fundamental to the normative domain. This view has been challenged by proponents of alternative X-first views such as value, fittingness and ought. This paper examines the debate about the analysis of normative reasons and argues for a new form of reductive naturalism that analyses normative reasons in terms of fittingness, ought and value. I argue that this view is compatible with Reasons First because fittingness and the type of ought and value appealed to are not robustly normative notions. It is also extensionally and explanatorily plausible, and thus has much to recommend it on both first-order and second-order grounds.
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APA
Lord, E. (2023). Everything First. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 97(1), 248-272. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akad012
Vancouver
Lord E. Everything First. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. 2023;97(1):248-272. doi:10.1093/arisup/akad012
BibTeX
@article{Lord2023,
author = {Lord, Errol},
title = {Everything First},
journal = {Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume},
year = {2023},
volume = {97},
number = {1},
pages = {248--272},
doi = {10.1093/arisup/akad012}
}
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