Locating value in moral progress: Valence asymmetries in folk intuitions
Analysis · 12.05.2026
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anag030 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Analysis, online erschienen am 12.05.2026. Verfasst von Filippo Domaneschi und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
What makes social change morally progressive or regressive? Recent debates on moral progress have largely overlooked the “location” issue: which goods are taken to bear the value that makes change progressive or regressive. This paper addresses this issue empirically, asking whether laypeople locate such value in well-being, principles-norms, or virtues, and whether they do so symmetrically across progress and regress. In two experiments, participants rated how much positive or negative changes in these three dimensions made a society more just or unjust. Improvements in principles-norms were judged more progressive than improvements in well-being or virtues. By contrast, losses in well-being and virtues were judged more regressive than losses in principles-norms. We suggest possible interpretations of this asymmetry, asking whether it reflects a rational and defensible structure or a cognitive bias in moral judgments about social change.
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APA
Domaneschi, F., & Bina, F. (2026). Locating value in moral progress: Valence asymmetries in folk intuitions. Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anag030
Vancouver
Domaneschi F, Bina F. Locating value in moral progress: Valence asymmetries in folk intuitions. Analysis. 2026. doi:10.1093/analys/anag030
BibTeX
@article{Domaneschi2026,
author = {Domaneschi, Filippo and Bina, Federico},
title = {Locating value in moral progress: Valence asymmetries in folk intuitions},
journal = {Analysis},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/analys/anag030}
}
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