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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

A dialogue model of belief

Douglas Walton

Argument & Computation · 2010

DOI: 10.1080/19462160903494576 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Argument & Computation, 2010. Verfasst von Douglas Walton. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 36 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper offers a new model of belief by embedding the Peircean account of belief into a formal dialogue system that uses argumentation schemes for practical reasoning and abductive reasoning. A belief is characterised as a stable proposition that is derived abductively by one agent in a dialogue from the commitment set (including commitments derived from actions and goals) of another agent. On the model (to give a rough summary), a belief is defined as a proposition held by an agent that (1) is not easily changed (stable), (2) is a matter of degree (held more or less weakly or strongly), (3) guides the goals and actions of the agent, and (4) is habitually or tenaciously held in a manner that indicates a strong commitment to defend it. It is argued that the new model overcomes the pervasive conflict in artificial intelligence between the belief-desire-intention model of reasoning and the commitment model.

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APA

Walton, D. (2010). A dialogue model of belief. Argument & Computation. https://doi.org/10.1080/19462160903494576

Vancouver

Walton D. A dialogue model of belief. Argument & Computation. 2010. doi:10.1080/19462160903494576

BibTeX
@article{Walton2010,
  author = {Walton, Douglas},
  title = {A dialogue model of belief},
  journal = {Argument & Computation},
  year = {2010},
  doi = {10.1080/19462160903494576}
}
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