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Mechanistic Evidence: Disambiguating the Russo–Williamson Thesis

Phyllis McKay Illari

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science · 2011-06 · 25 (2) · 139-157

DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2011.574856 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2011-06. Verfasst von Phyllis McKay Illari. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 124-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 20 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Russo and Williamson claim that establishing causal claims requires mechanistic and difference-making evidence. In this article, I will argue that Russo and Williamson's formulation of their thesis is multiply ambiguous. I will make three distinctions: mechanistic evidence as type vs object of evidence; what mechanism or mechanisms we want evidence of; and how much evidence of a mechanism we require. I will feed these more precise meanings back into the Russo–Williamson thesis and argue that it is both true and false: two weaker versions of the thesis are worth supporting, while the stronger versions are not. Further, my distinctions are of wider concern because they allow us to make more precise claims about what kinds of evidence are required in particular cases.

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APA

Illari, P. M. (2011). Mechanistic Evidence: Disambiguating the Russo–Williamson Thesis. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 25(2), 139-157. https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2011.574856

Vancouver

Illari PM. Mechanistic Evidence: Disambiguating the Russo–Williamson Thesis. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 2011;25(2):139-157. doi:10.1080/02698595.2011.574856

BibTeX
@article{Illari2011,
  author = {Illari, Phyllis McKay},
  title = {Mechanistic Evidence: Disambiguating the Russo–Williamson Thesis},
  journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science},
  year = {2011},
  volume = {25},
  number = {2},
  pages = {139--157},
  doi = {10.1080/02698595.2011.574856}
}
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