A theory of presumption for everyday argumentation
Pragmatics & Cognition · 12.06.2007 · 15 (2) · 313-346
DOI: 10.1075/pc.15.2.06god ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Pragmatics & Cognition, online erschienen am 19.06.2007. Verfasst von David M. Godden und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 40-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The paper considers contemporary models of presumption in terms of their ability to contribute to a working theory of presumption for argumentation. Beginning with the Whatelian model, we consider its contemporary developments and alternatives, as proposed by Sidgwick, Kauffeld, Cronkhite, Rescher, Walton, Freeman, Ullmann-Margalit, and Hansen. Based on these accounts, we present a picture of presumptions characterized by their nature, function, foundation and force. On our account, presumption is a modal status that is attached to a claim and has the effect of shifting, in a dialogue, a burden of proof set at a local level. Presumptions can be analysed and evaluated inferentially as components of rule-based structures. Presumptions are defeasible, and the force of a presumption is a function of its normative foundation. This picture seeks to provide a framework to guide the development of specific theories of presumption.
Zitieren
APA
Godden, D. M., & Walton, D. N. (2007). A theory of presumption for everyday argumentation. Pragmatics & Cognition, 15(2), 313-346. https://doi.org/10.1075/pc.15.2.06god
Vancouver
Godden DM, Walton DN. A theory of presumption for everyday argumentation. Pragmatics & Cognition. 2007;15(2):313-346. doi:10.1075/pc.15.2.06god
BibTeX
@article{Godden2007,
author = {Godden, David M. and Walton, Douglas N.},
title = {A theory of presumption for everyday argumentation},
journal = {Pragmatics & Cognition},
year = {2007},
volume = {15},
number = {2},
pages = {313--346},
doi = {10.1075/pc.15.2.06god}
}
EUVIMED