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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Evidence from formal logical reasoning reveals that the language of thought is not natural language

Hope Kean iD, Alexander Fung, Paris Jaggers, Jason Chen, Joshua S Rule iD, Yael Benn iD, Joshua B Tenenbaum, Steven T Piantadosi iD, Rosemary A Varley iD, Evelina Fedorenko iD

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 14.07.2026 · 123 (28)

DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2520095123 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, online erschienen am 06.07.2026. Verfasst von Hope Kean und 9 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Language, Logic, Thinking, Brain. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 268 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: NSF | EDU | Division of Research on Learning in Formal and Informal Settings (DRL), Leverhulme Trust (The Leverhulme Trust).

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Humans are endowed with a powerful capacity for inductive and deductive logical thought: we easily form generalizations based on a few examples and draw conclusions from known premises. Humans also arguably have the most sophisticated communication system in the animal kingdom: natural language allows us to express complex and structured meanings. Some have therefore argued for a tight relationship between complex thought and language, postulating that reasoning, including logical reasoning, relies on linguistic representations. We systematically investigated the relationship between logical reasoning and language using two complementary approaches. First, we used noninvasive brain imaging (fMRI) to examine neural activity as healthy adults engaged in logical reasoning tasks. And second, we behaviorally evaluated logical abilities in individuals with extensive lesions to the language brain areas and consequent severe linguistic impairment. Our findings reveal that the language brain network is not engaged during logical reasoning, and patients with severe aphasia exhibit intact performance on logic tasks. Instead, inductive reasoning recruits the domain-general multiple demand network implicated broadly in goal-directed behaviors, whereas deductive reasoning draws on brain regions that are distinct from both the language and the multiple demand networks. Together, these results indicate that linguistic representations are neither utilized nor required for inductive or deductive logical reasoning.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

LanguageLogicThinkingBrainHumansMagnetic Resonance ImagingFemaleMaleAdultAphasiaBrain MappingMiddle Aged

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

aphasiacognitive neuroscience; languagefMRIlanguage of thoughtlogical reasoning

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139.
  • McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139.
  • Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London, WC1N 1PF, United Kingdom.
  • Department of Psychology, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720.
  • School of Psychology, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester M15 6BX, United Kingdom.

ORCID-Profile: Hope Kean, Joshua S Rule, Yael Benn, Steven T Piantadosi, Rosemary A Varley, Evelina Fedorenko

Förderung

  • NSF | EDU | Division of Research on Learning in Formal and Informal Settings (DRL)
  • Leverhulme Trust (The Leverhulme Trust)

Zitieren

APA

Kean, H., Fung, A., Jaggers, P., Chen, J., Rule, J. S., Benn, Y., Tenenbaum, J. B., Piantadosi, S. T., Varley, R. A., & Fedorenko, E. (2026). Evidence from formal logical reasoning reveals that the language of thought is not natural language. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 123(28). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2520095123

Vancouver

Kean H, Fung A, Jaggers P, Chen J, Rule JS, Benn Y, et al. Evidence from formal logical reasoning reveals that the language of thought is not natural language. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2026;123(28). doi:10.1073/pnas.2520095123

BibTeX
@article{Kean2026,
  author = {Kean, Hope and Fung, Alexander and Jaggers, Paris and Chen, Jason and Rule, Joshua S and Benn, Yael and Tenenbaum, Joshua B and Piantadosi, Steven T and Varley, Rosemary A and Fedorenko, Evelina},
  title = {Evidence from formal logical reasoning reveals that the language of thought is not natural language},
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {123},
  number = {28},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.2520095123}
}
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