Increasing benefits in one-time public goods does not promote cooperation
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 08.10.2024 · 121 (41)
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2410326121 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, online erschienen am 04.10.2024. Verfasst von Natalie Struwe und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck 6020, Austria. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 44 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Austrian Science Fund (FWF).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The long tradition of research on cooperation includes a well-established finding that individuals respond to the degree of conflict between self- and collective interests (that is, the relative benefits from cooperation) in providing public goods. Existing empirical evidence builds upon settings where participants make multiple decisions or strategically consider alternative scenarios. Here, we consider a decision setting where participants face a one-time (single-decision) setting. One-time cooperative encounters often occur in volunteering or donating to immediate needs for crisis relief. For these distinct and highly relevant settings, we report a lack of responsiveness to increases in cooperation benefits, thereby highlighting limits to our understanding of the determinants of one-time cooperation encounters. Across two studies, n = 2,232 individuals participate in treatments where we vary across participants the relative benefit from contributing to a public good (that is, the marginal per capita return, the MPCR). We examine decisions from alternative participant pools (UK general population vs. students), implementations varying the physical distance between participants (online vs. in the laboratory), and more complex decision settings considering group-to-group interactions including not only providers but also donors to public goods. Throughout, neither average contribution levels, nor the distribution of contributions are significantly affected by the increases in cooperation benefits. The mechanism behind these results can be explained by the close correlation between expectations of other’s cooperation and own cooperation, and the fact that these expectations do not increase with higher benefits from cooperation.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck 6020, Austria.
- The Ostrom Workshop, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408.
- Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405.
ORCID-Profile: Natalie Struwe, Esther Blanco, James M Walker
Förderung
- Austrian Science Fund (FWF)
Zitieren
APA
Struwe, N., Blanco, E., & Walker, J. M. (2024). Increasing benefits in one-time public goods does not promote cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 121(41). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2410326121
Vancouver
Struwe N, Blanco E, Walker JM. Increasing benefits in one-time public goods does not promote cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2024;121(41). doi:10.1073/pnas.2410326121
BibTeX
@article{Struwe2024,
author = {Struwe, Natalie and Blanco, Esther and Walker, James M},
title = {Increasing benefits in one-time public goods does not promote cooperation},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
year = {2024},
volume = {121},
number = {41},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.2410326121}
}
EUVIMED