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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Understanding Nash epidemics

Simon K Schnyder iD, John J Molina, Ryoichi Yamamoto iD, Matthew S Turner

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 04.03.2025 · 122 (9)

DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2409362122 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, online erschienen am 27.02.2025. Verfasst von Simon K Schnyder und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Institute of Industrial Science, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo 153-8505, Japan. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Epidemics. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 15-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 94 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science London (JSPS), Leverhulme Trust.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Faced with a dangerous epidemic humans will spontaneously social distance to reduce their risk of infection at a socioeconomic cost. Compartmentalized epidemic models have been extended to include this endogenous decision making: Individuals choose their behavior to optimize a utility function, self-consistently giving rise to population behavior. Here, we study the properties of the resulting Nash equilibria, in which no member of the population can gain an advantage by unilaterally adopting different behavior. We leverage an analytic solution that yields fully time-dependent rational population behavior to obtain, 1) a simple relationship between rational social distancing behavior and the current number of infections; 2) scaling results for how the infection peak and number of total cases depend on the cost of contracting the disease; 3) characteristic infection costs that divide regimes of strong and weak behavioral response; 4) a closed form expression for the value of the utility. We discuss how these analytic results provide a deep and intuitive understanding of the disease dynamics, useful for both individuals and policymakers. In particular, the relationship between social distancing and infections represents a heuristic that could be communicated to the population to encourage, or “bootstrap,” rational behavior.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

EpidemicsHumansPhysical DistancingCOVID-19

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

control theoryepidemiologygame theorymathematical modelingmean-field games

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Institute of Industrial Science, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo 153-8505, Japan.
  • Department of Chemical Engineering, Kyoto University, Kyoto 615-8510, Japan.
  • Department of Physics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom.
  • Institute for Global Pandemic Planning, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom.

ORCID-Profile: Simon K Schnyder, Ryoichi Yamamoto

Förderung

  • Japan Society for the Promotion of Science London (JSPS)
  • Leverhulme Trust

Zitieren

APA

Schnyder, S. K., Molina, J. J., Yamamoto, R., & Turner, M. S. (2025). Understanding Nash epidemics. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 122(9). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2409362122

Vancouver

Schnyder SK, Molina JJ, Yamamoto R, Turner MS. Understanding Nash epidemics. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2025;122(9). doi:10.1073/pnas.2409362122

BibTeX
@article{Schnyder2025,
  author = {Schnyder, Simon K and Molina, John J and Yamamoto, Ryoichi and Turner, Matthew S},
  title = {Understanding Nash epidemics},
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {122},
  number = {9},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.2409362122}
}
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