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Demonstratives as attention tools: Evidence of mentalistic representations within language

Julian Jara-Ettinger iD, Paula Rubio-Fernandez

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 2024

DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2402068121 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2024. Verfasst von Julian Jara-Ettinger und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06510. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Language, Attention. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 13-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 69 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Science Foundation (NSF), Research Council of Norway.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Linguistic communication is an intrinsically social activity that enables us to share thoughts across minds. Many complex social uses of language can be captured by domain-general representations of other minds (i.e., mentalistic representations) that externally modulate linguistic meaning through Gricean reasoning. However, here we show that representations of others’ attention are embedded within language itself. Across ten languages, we show that demonstratives—basic grammatical words (e.g., “this”/“that”) which are evolutionarily ancient, learned early in life, and documented in all known languages—are intrinsic attention tools. Beyond their spatial meanings, demonstratives encode both joint attention and the direction in which the listener must turn to establish it. Crucially, the frequency of the spatial and attentional uses of demonstratives varies across languages, suggesting that both spatial and mentalistic representations are part of their conventional meaning. Using computational modeling, we show that mentalistic representations of others’ attention are internally encoded in demonstratives, with their effect further boosted by Gricean reasoning. Yet, speakers are largely unaware of this, incorrectly reporting that they primarily capture spatial representations. Our findings show that representations of other people’s cognitive states (namely, their attention) are embedded in language and suggest that the most basic building blocks of the linguistic system crucially rely on social cognition.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

LanguageAttentionHumansCognitionLinguisticsCommunicationFemaleMale

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

attentiondemonstrativeslanguagepragmaticssocial cognition

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06510.
  • Department of Computer Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520.
  • Wu Tsai Institute, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06510.
  • Multimodal Language Department, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen 6525XD, Netherlands.
  • Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas, University of Oslo, Oslo 0315, Norway.

ORCID-Profile: Julian Jara-Ettinger

Förderung

  • National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Research Council of Norway

Zitieren

APA

Jara-Ettinger, J., & Rubio-Fernandez, P. (2024). Demonstratives as attention tools: Evidence of mentalistic representations within language. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2402068121

Vancouver

Jara-Ettinger J, Rubio-Fernandez P. Demonstratives as attention tools: Evidence of mentalistic representations within language. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2024. doi:10.1073/pnas.2402068121

BibTeX
@article{JaraEttinger2024,
  author = {Jara-Ettinger, Julian and Rubio-Fernandez, Paula},
  title = {Demonstratives as attention tools: Evidence of mentalistic representations within language},
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.2402068121}
}
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