Evolving general cooperation with a Bayesian theory of mind
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 24.06.2025 · 122 (25)
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2400993122 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, online erschienen am 16.06.2025. Verfasst von Max Kleiman-Weiner und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Theory of Mind, Cooperative Behavior. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 16-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 111 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: NSF STC, ONR.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Theories of the evolution of cooperation through reciprocity explain how unrelated self-interested individuals can accomplish more together than they can on their own. The most prominent theories of reciprocity, such as tit-for-tat or win-stay-lose-shift, are inflexible automata that lack a theory of mind—the human ability to infer the hidden mental states in others’ minds. Here, we develop a model of reciprocity with a theory of mind, the Bayesian Reciprocator. When making decisions, this model does not simply seek to maximize its own payoff. Instead, it also values the payoffs of others—but only to the extent it believes that those others are also cooperating in the same way. To compute its beliefs about others, the Bayesian Reciprocator uses a probabilistic and generative approach to infer the latent preferences, beliefs, and strategies of others through interaction and observation. We evaluate the Bayesian Reciprocator using a generator over games where every interaction is unique, as well as in classic environments such as the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The Bayesian Reciprocator enables the emergence of both direct-reciprocity when games are repeated and indirect-reciprocity when interactions are one-shot but observable to others. In an evolutionary competition, the Bayesian Reciprocator outcompetes existing automata strategies and sustains cooperation across a larger range of environments and noise settings than prior approaches. This work quantifies the advantage of a theory of mind for cooperation in an evolutionary game theoretic framework and suggests avenues for building artificially intelligent agents with more human-like learning mechanisms that can cooperate across many environments.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139.
- Department of Marketing and International Business, Foster School of Business, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195.
- Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195.
- Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139.
- Institute for Data, Systems, and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139.
ORCID-Profile: Max Kleiman-Weiner, David G Rand
Förderung
- NSF STC
- ONR
Zitieren
APA
Kleiman-Weiner, M., Vientós, A., Rand, D. G., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2025). Evolving general cooperation with a Bayesian theory of mind. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 122(25). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2400993122
Vancouver
Kleiman-Weiner M, Vientós A, Rand DG, Tenenbaum JB. Evolving general cooperation with a Bayesian theory of mind. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2025;122(25). doi:10.1073/pnas.2400993122
BibTeX
@article{KleimanWeiner2025,
author = {Kleiman-Weiner, Max and Vientós, Alejandro and Rand, David G and Tenenbaum, Joshua B},
title = {Evolving general cooperation with a Bayesian theory of mind},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
year = {2025},
volume = {122},
number = {25},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.2400993122}
}
EUVIMED