Deep mechanism design: Learning social and economic policies for human benefit
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 2025
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2319949121 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2025. Verfasst von Andrea Tacchetti und 8 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Google DeepMind, London EC4A 3TW. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Machine Learning, Deep Learning, Public Policy. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 102 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Human society is coordinated by mechanisms that control how prices are agreed, taxes are set, and electoral votes are tallied. The design of robust and effective mechanisms for human benefit is a core problem in the social, economic, and political sciences. Here, we discuss the recent application of modern tools from AI research, including deep neural networks trained with reinforcement learning (RL), to create more desirable mechanisms for people. We review the application of machine learning to design effective auctions, learn optimal tax policies, and discover redistribution policies that win the popular vote among human users. We discuss the challenge of accurately modeling human preferences and the problem of aligning a mechanism to the wishes of a potentially diverse group. We highlight the importance of ensuring that research into “deep mechanism design” is conducted safely and ethically.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Google DeepMind, London EC4A 3TW.
- Princeton Language and Intelligence, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544.
- Gatsby Computational Neuroscience Unit, University College London, London W1T 4JG, United Kingdom.
- Yale Law School, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8215.
- Harvard John A. Paulson School Of Engineering And Applied Sciences, Harvard University Boston, MA 02138.
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3UD, United Kingdom.
ORCID-Profile: Raphael Koster, Jan Balaguer, Liu Leqi, Mîruna Pislar, David C Parkes
Zitieren
APA
Tacchetti, A., Koster, R., Balaguer, J., Leqi, L., Pislar, M., Botvinick, M. M., Tuyls, K., Parkes, D. C., & Summerfield, C. (2025). Deep mechanism design: Learning social and economic policies for human benefit. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2319949121
Vancouver
Tacchetti A, Koster R, Balaguer J, Leqi L, Pislar M, Botvinick MM, et al. Deep mechanism design: Learning social and economic policies for human benefit. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2025. doi:10.1073/pnas.2319949121
BibTeX
@article{Tacchetti2025,
author = {Tacchetti, Andrea and Koster, Raphael and Balaguer, Jan and Leqi, Liu and Pislar, Mîruna and Botvinick, Matthew M and Tuyls, Karl and Parkes, David C and Summerfield, Christopher},
title = {Deep mechanism design: Learning social and economic policies for human benefit},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.2319949121}
}
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