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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

A simple mechanism for collective decision-making in the absence of payoff information

Daniele Carlesso iD, Justin M McNab iD, Christopher J Lustri iD, Simon Garnier iD, Chris R Reid iD

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 2023

DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2216217120 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2023. Verfasst von Daniele Carlesso und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Natural Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cognition, Ants. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 12-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 90 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: Hermon Slade Foundation, National Science Foundation, Department of Education and Training | Australian Research Council.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Animals are often faced with time-critical decisions without prior information about their actions’ outcomes. In such scenarios, individuals budget their investment into the task to cut their losses in case of an adverse outcome. In animal groups, this may be challenging because group members can only access local information, and consensus can only be achieved through distributed interactions among individuals. Here, we combined experimental analyses with theoretical modeling to investigate how groups modulate their investment into tasks in uncertain conditions. Workers of the arboreal weaver ant Oecophylla smaragdina form three-dimensional chains using their own bodies to bridge vertical gaps between existing trails and new areas to explore. The cost of a chain increases with its length because ants participating in the structure are prevented from performing other tasks. The payoffs of chain formation, however, remain unknown to the ants until the chain is complete and they can explore the new area. We demonstrate that weaver ants cap their investment into chains, and do not form complete chains when the gap is taller than 90 mm. We show that individual ants budget the time they spend in chains depending on their distance to the ground, and propose a distance-based model of chain formation that explains the emergence of this tradeoff without the need to invoke complex cognition. Our study provides insights into the proximate mechanisms that lead individuals to engage (or not) in collective actions and furthers our knowledge of how decentralized groups make adaptive decisions in uncertain conditions.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

CognitionAntsAnimalsUncertaintyConsensus

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

collective behaviorcollective decision-makingself-assemblyswarm intelligenceuncertainty

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Natural Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia.
  • School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW 2006, Australia.
  • School of Mathematical and Physical Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia.
  • Department of Biological Sciences, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, NJ 07102.

ORCID-Profile: Daniele Carlesso, Justin M McNab, Christopher J Lustri, Simon Garnier, Chris R Reid

Förderung

  • Hermon Slade Foundation
  • National Science Foundation
  • Department of Education and Training | Australian Research Council

Zitieren

APA

Carlesso, D., McNab, J. M., Lustri, C. J., Garnier, S., & Reid, C. R. (2023). A simple mechanism for collective decision-making in the absence of payoff information. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2216217120

Vancouver

Carlesso D, McNab JM, Lustri CJ, Garnier S, Reid CR. A simple mechanism for collective decision-making in the absence of payoff information. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2023. doi:10.1073/pnas.2216217120

BibTeX
@article{Carlesso2023,
  author = {Carlesso, Daniele and McNab, Justin M and Lustri, Christopher J and Garnier, Simon and Reid, Chris R},
  title = {A simple mechanism for collective decision-making in the absence of payoff information},
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.2216217120}
}
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