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Spatial protection of cooperation by voting-based allocation

Keyu Guo iD, Xiaogang Li iD, Wei Wang iD, Jiuming Feng iD, Lei Shi iD

Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · 01.06.2026 · 36 (6)

DOI: 10.1063/5.0333253 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, online erschienen am 01.06.2026. Verfasst von Keyu Guo und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China. Die Arbeit nennt 48 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Philosophy and Social Science Foundation of China, NSF of Yunnan Province, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The Public Goods Game serves as a classic framework for social dilemmas. Behavioral experiments demonstrate that individuals possess distinct allocation preferences. Existing models typically assume egalitarian allocation. Furthermore, most evolutionary frameworks treat allocation rules as fixed, thereby overlooking the critical process of collective rule selection. Here, we develop an evolutionary game framework that couples individual behavior with voting-based allocation rules. Individuals vote between the egalitarian allocation and the non-egalitarian allocation rule which is modulated by an incentive weight to determine the contribution-based allocation weight of the total payoff. We find that cooperation exhibits a non-monotonic, multi-phase trajectory driven by voting dynamics. At moderate incentive weight, voting induces rule differences at cluster boundaries, giving rise to a self-organized protective layer of contribution-proportional defectors that shields cooperators from exploitation by egalitarian defectors. However, as incentives increase further, this protective layer weakens, transitioning the dynamics to direct competition. We introduce a collective choice mechanism to evolutionary game theory, revealing that the democratic voting mechanism leverages the non-egalitarian allocation rule to shape protective spatial architectures and stabilize cooperation in social dilemmas.

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China.
  • Research Institute of Data Science, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai 201209, China.

ORCID-Profile: Keyu Guo, Xiaogang Li, Wei Wang, Jiuming Feng, Lei Shi

Förderung

  • National Philosophy and Social Science Foundation of China
  • NSF of Yunnan Province
  • Yunnan University of Finance and Economics

Zitieren

APA

Guo, K., Li, X., Wang, W., Feng, J., & Shi, L. (2026). Spatial protection of cooperation by voting-based allocation. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, 36(6). https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0333253

Vancouver

Guo K, Li X, Wang W, Feng J, Shi L. Spatial protection of cooperation by voting-based allocation. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science. 2026;36(6). doi:10.1063/5.0333253

BibTeX
@article{Guo2026,
  author = {Guo, Keyu and Li, Xiaogang and Wang, Wei and Feng, Jiuming and Shi, Lei},
  title = {Spatial protection of cooperation by voting-based allocation},
  journal = {Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {36},
  number = {6},
  doi = {10.1063/5.0333253}
}
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