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Evolutionary dynamics of stochastic games in set-structured populations

Meng Gao iD, Zhi Li iD, Te Wu iD

Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · 2024

DOI: 10.1063/5.0222688 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, 2024. Verfasst von Meng Gao und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Mechano-electronic Engineering, Xidian University, Xi'an 710071, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Game Theory, Stochastic Processes, Biological Evolution, Population Dynamics. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 50 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Fundamental Research Funds for Central Universities, Xidian University.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In structured populations, the ecology of games may vary over neighborhoods. The effect of the ecological variations on population dynamics remains largely unknown. We here incorporate the ecological variations into the set-structured populations to explore the coevolutionary dynamics of the ecology and cooperation. Individuals of a population are distributed over sets. Interactions occur in the form of evolutionary games. When two individuals share more common sets, they play the weak prisoner’s dilemma. Otherwise, they play the strong prisoner’s dilemma. Both the set memberships and the strategy update in the evolutionary process. Changes in set memberships hold sway over the games to be played, which, in turn, influences the performance of strategies. Combining evolutionary set theory and random walks on graphs, we derived the conditions for cooperation to be selected under the weak selection limit. We find that a denser set-structured population increases the probability of individuals participating in a weak prisoner’s dilemma, and thereby promoting the spread of cooperation. Properly modulating the population structure and the payoff feedback can further lower the critical benefit–cost ratio required for cooperation to be selected. Our results may help better understand the effects of ecological variations in enhancing cooperative behavior in set-structured populations.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Game TheoryStochastic ProcessesBiological EvolutionPopulation DynamicsCooperative BehaviorHumansPrisoner Dilemma

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Mechano-electronic Engineering, Xidian University, Xi'an 710071, China.

ORCID-Profile: Meng Gao, Zhi Li, Te Wu

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Fundamental Research Funds for Central Universities, Xidian University

Zitieren

APA

Gao, M., Li, Z., & Wu, T. (2024). Evolutionary dynamics of stochastic games in set-structured populations. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science. https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0222688

Vancouver

Gao M, Li Z, Wu T. Evolutionary dynamics of stochastic games in set-structured populations. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science. 2024. doi:10.1063/5.0222688

BibTeX
@article{Gao2024,
  author = {Gao, Meng and Li, Zhi and Wu, Te},
  title = {Evolutionary dynamics of stochastic games in set-structured populations},
  journal = {Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.1063/5.0222688}
}
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