EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

When selection pays: Structured public goods game with a generalized interaction mode

Ju Han, Xiaojie Chen iD, Attila Szolnoki iD

Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · 01.03.2024 · 34 (3)

DOI: 10.1063/5.0201582 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, online erschienen am 14.03.2024. Verfasst von Ju Han und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 46-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 54 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, National Research, Development and Innovation Office.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The public goods game is a broadly used paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. According to the basic assumption, the interaction graph determines the connections of a player where the focal actor forms a common venture with the nearest neighbors. In reality, however, not all of our partners are involved in every game. To elaborate this observation, we propose a model where individuals choose just some selected neighbors from the complete set to form a group for public goods. We explore the potential consequences by using a pair-approximation approach in a weak selection limit. We theoretically analyze how the number of total neighbors and the actual size of the restricted group influence the critical enhancement factor where cooperation becomes dominant over defection. Furthermore, we systematically compare our model with the traditional setup and show that the critical enhancement factor is lower than in the case when all players are present in the social dilemma. Hence, the suggested restricted interaction mode offers a better condition for the evolution of cooperation. Our theoretical findings are supported by numerical calculations.

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China.
  • Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary.

ORCID-Profile: Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • National Research, Development and Innovation Office

Zitieren

APA

Han, J., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2024). When selection pays: Structured public goods game with a generalized interaction mode. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, 34(3). https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0201582

Vancouver

Han J, Chen X, Szolnoki A. When selection pays: Structured public goods game with a generalized interaction mode. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science. 2024;34(3). doi:10.1063/5.0201582

BibTeX
@article{Han2024,
  author = {Han, Ju and Chen, Xiaojie and Szolnoki, Attila},
  title = {When selection pays: Structured public goods game with a generalized interaction mode},
  journal = {Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {34},
  number = {3},
  doi = {10.1063/5.0201582}
}
Kostenlos starten →