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Stackelberg Mean Field Games: convergence and existence results to the problem of principal with multiple agents in competition

Mao Fabrice Djete

ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations · 08.07.2026

DOI: 10.1051/cocv/2026056 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations, online erschienen am 08.07.2026. Verfasst von Mao Fabrice Djete.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In a situation of moral hazard, this paper investigates the problem of Principal with n Agents when the number of Agents n goes to infinity. There is competition between the Agents expressed by the fact that they optimize their utility functions through a Nash equilibrium criterion. Each Agent is offered by the Principal a contract which is divided into a Markovian part involving the state/production of the Agent and a non--Markovian part involving the states/productions of all the other Agents. The Agents are in interactions. By the help of the mean field games theory, we are able to formulate an appropriate limit problem involving a Principal with a representative Agent. We start by solving the problem of both the Principal and the representative Agent in this limit problem. Then, when n goes to infinity, we show that the problem of Principal with n Agents converges to the limit problem of Principal with a representative Agent. A notable result is that, despite allowing a general type of contracts, it is approximately optimal for the Principal to offer contracts to the n Agents that are maps of the empirical distribution of states/productions and controls of the Agents

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APA

Djete, M. F. (2026). Stackelberg Mean Field Games: convergence and existence results to the problem of principal with multiple agents in competition. ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations. https://doi.org/10.1051/cocv/2026056

Vancouver

Djete MF. Stackelberg Mean Field Games: convergence and existence results to the problem of principal with multiple agents in competition. ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations. 2026. doi:10.1051/cocv/2026056

BibTeX
@article{Djete2026,
  author = {Djete, Mao Fabrice},
  title = {Stackelberg Mean Field Games: convergence and existence results to the problem of principal with multiple agents in competition},
  journal = {ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1051/cocv/2026056}
}
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