Do complement clauses with first- or third-person perspective support false-belief reasoning? A training study with English-speaking 3-year-olds.
Developmental Psychology · 2025
DOI: 10.1037/dev0001808 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Developmental Psychology, 2025. Verfasst von Ditte Boeg Thomsen und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics, University of Copenhagen. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Theory of Mind, Language Development. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref). Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Economic and Social Research Council.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
To investigate whether acquisition of the perspective-marking grammar of complement-clause constructions supports progression in children's false-belief reasoning, we conducted a training study with 76 English-speaking 3-year-olds from the North-West of England (age range: 3;0-3;10 years, 50% female, 80% White). Children were randomly assigned to one of three maximally comparable training conditions, and in a 4-week eight-session program, all children participated in the same training activities with mental-state contrasts. Depending on condition, activities were mediated linguistically with either simple clauses, first-person complements, or third-person complements. The study addressed critical confounds in previous training studies by avoiding the use of complement clauses in false-belief tests and controlling individual differences in memory, executive functioning, general language, and pretest proficiency with complement clauses. The results yielded strong support for the hypothesis of a causal influence of complement-clause exposure on false-belief progression, as children trained with first-person complements advanced significantly more in false-belief reasoning from pretest to posttest than children trained with simple clauses. Examining the roles of first- and third-person complements, a direct comparison between progression in the two complement-clause conditions showed no significant difference, but only children trained with first-person complements progressed significantly more than children in the control condition trained with simple clauses. Follow-up analyses suggested that first- and third-person complements each support false-belief progression at different stages of development. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics, University of Copenhagen.
- Division of Psychology, Communication, and Human Neuroscience, University of Manchester.
- Department of Linguistics and English Language, Lancaster University.
ORCID-Profile: Ditte Boeg Thomsen, Birsu Kandemirci, Anna Theakston, Silke Brandt
Förderung
- Economic and Social Research Council
Zitieren
APA
Boeg Thomsen, D., Kandemirci, B., Theakston, A., & Brandt, S. (2025). Do complement clauses with first- or third-person perspective support false-belief reasoning? A training study with English-speaking 3-year-olds. Developmental Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037/dev0001808
Vancouver
Boeg Thomsen D, Kandemirci B, Theakston A, Brandt S. Do complement clauses with first- or third-person perspective support false-belief reasoning? A training study with English-speaking 3-year-olds. Developmental Psychology. 2025. doi:10.1037/dev0001808
BibTeX
@article{BoegThomsen2025,
author = {Boeg Thomsen, Ditte and Kandemirci, Birsu and Theakston, Anna and Brandt, Silke},
title = {Do complement clauses with first- or third-person perspective support false-belief reasoning? A training study with English-speaking 3-year-olds},
journal = {Developmental Psychology},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.1037/dev0001808}
}
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