Presidential discretion under the Antiquities Act
Journal of Institutional Economics · 2026 · 22
DOI: 10.1017/s1744137426100800 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Institutional Economics, online erschienen am 11.08.2026. Verfasst von Jordan K. Lofthouse. Die Arbeit nennt 82 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper analyses executive discretion under the Antiquities Act of 1906, which gives the President of the United States the unilateral authority to designate national monuments on federal lands. Designations are intended to protect objects of historic or scientific interest and must be confined to the smallest area compatible with their protection. Since 1906, presidents have interpreted the law broadly, designating over 150 monuments, many of which span large areas. Congress and the courts have done little to curb presidential discretion. Using public choice economics, this paper argues that presidents use monument designations to (1) improve electoral prospects for themselves and fellow party members, (2) engage in strategic political exchanges, and (3) enhance their presidential legacy. Several case studies provide evidence that recent presidents have rationally used their broad discretion under the Antiquities Act to improve electoral outcomes, exchange with strategic entities, and bolster their legacy.
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APA
Lofthouse, J. K. (2026). Presidential discretion under the Antiquities Act. Journal of Institutional Economics, 22. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137426100800
Vancouver
Lofthouse JK. Presidential discretion under the Antiquities Act. Journal of Institutional Economics. 2026;22. doi:10.1017/s1744137426100800
BibTeX
@article{Lofthouse2026,
author = {Lofthouse, Jordan K.},
title = {Presidential discretion under the Antiquities Act},
journal = {Journal of Institutional Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {22},
doi = {10.1017/s1744137426100800}
}
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