Moral dissonance and judicial dynamics: a differential model of normative misalignment
Journal of Institutional Economics · 2026 · 22
DOI: 10.1017/s1744137426100721 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Institutional Economics, online erschienen am 14.07.2026. Verfasst von Massimiliano Marletta. Die Arbeit nennt 14 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article develops a dynamic model of judicial behaviour in which moral alignment operates as an anti-function of judicial utility. The model assumes that moral adherence can generate disutility whenever it conflicts with legal or reputational incentives. Judges maximise a time-dependent utility function driven by normative conformity, reputational rewards, and moral dissonance. Using a system of differential equations, the analysis examines how judicial and social morality co-evolve under competing institutional incentives. The model formalises moral dissonance as an endogenous friction that both destabilises and renews institutional order, transforming moral integrity into a catalyst for normative evolution. This framework provides a micro-dynamic explanation for recurrent moral-legal tensions within judicial institutions.
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APA
Marletta, M. (2026). Moral dissonance and judicial dynamics: a differential model of normative misalignment. Journal of Institutional Economics, 22. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137426100721
Vancouver
Marletta M. Moral dissonance and judicial dynamics: a differential model of normative misalignment. Journal of Institutional Economics. 2026;22. doi:10.1017/s1744137426100721
BibTeX
@article{Marletta2026,
author = {Marletta, Massimiliano},
title = {Moral dissonance and judicial dynamics: a differential model of normative misalignment},
journal = {Journal of Institutional Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {22},
doi = {10.1017/s1744137426100721}
}
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