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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

The dynamics of anti-corruption: a multi-level framework for intervention design

Balikees Rotinwa-Oseni, Thorsten Chmura, Ludovica Orlandi, Lerato Dixon

Journal of Institutional Economics · 2026 · 22

DOI: 10.1017/s1744137426100642 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Institutional Economics, online erschienen am 29.06.2026. Verfasst von Balikees Rotinwa-Oseni und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 104 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Corruption persists because feedback between individual behaviour, social norms, and institutional rules creates self-reinforcing dynamics. Although laboratory experiments provide growing evidence on anti-corruption interventions, this literature remains fragmented, failing to explain why enforcement succeeds in some contexts and fails in others. To address this gap, this paper develops a Dynamic Corruption Equilibrium (DCE) Framework. Drawing on a Bibliometric-Systematic Review of 132 experimental studies, it identifies six intervention classes across institutional, social, and individual levels, with behavioural dispositions acting as cross-cutting moderators. While existing studies examine these interventions in isolation, overlooking cross-level interactions and behavioural heterogeneity, the DCE Framework integrates insights from complex adaptive systems theory and institutional economics to conceptualise corruption as a dynamic, multi-level system. By specifying three mechanisms: cross-level feedback loops, conditional pathways, and system bistability, the framework explains how corruption equilibria become self-reinforcing or shift, offering a diagnostic lens for analysing intervention effectiveness within complex institutional environments.

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APA

Rotinwa-Oseni, B., Chmura, T., Orlandi, L., & Dixon, L. (2026). The dynamics of anti-corruption: a multi-level framework for intervention design. Journal of Institutional Economics, 22. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137426100642

Vancouver

Rotinwa-Oseni B, Chmura T, Orlandi L, Dixon L. The dynamics of anti-corruption: a multi-level framework for intervention design. Journal of Institutional Economics. 2026;22. doi:10.1017/s1744137426100642

BibTeX
@article{RotinwaOseni2026,
  author = {Rotinwa-Oseni, Balikees and Chmura, Thorsten and Orlandi, Ludovica and Dixon, Lerato},
  title = {The dynamics of anti-corruption: a multi-level framework for intervention design},
  journal = {Journal of Institutional Economics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {22},
  doi = {10.1017/s1744137426100642}
}
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