Pension fund board governance and asset allocation: evidence from Switzerland
Journal of Pension Economics and Finance · 2023-07 · 22 (3) · 400-424
DOI: 10.1017/s1474747221000494 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, online erschienen am 11.02.2022. Verfasst von Nadège Bregnard und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 56 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study whether pension fund board governance relates to asset allocation. Pension funds with well-governed boards have greater international diversification, lower cash holdings, and, when pension funds are small, invest more in risky assets. In particular, pension fund boards that establish comprehensive investment policies invest more in equities, in foreign assets, and hold less cash. We argue that a comprehensive investment policy is likely to serve as a proxy for the financial expertise available to the fund while it provides the set up to facilitate decision making. Finally, we further show that the presence of external financial experts is also associated with lower cash holdings.
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APA
Bregnard, N., & Salva, C. (2023). Pension fund board governance and asset allocation: evidence from Switzerland. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 22(3), 400-424. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1474747221000494
Vancouver
Bregnard N, Salva C. Pension fund board governance and asset allocation: evidence from Switzerland. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance. 2023;22(3):400-424. doi:10.1017/s1474747221000494
BibTeX
@article{Bregnard2023,
author = {Bregnard, Nadège and Salva, Carolina},
title = {Pension fund board governance and asset allocation: evidence from Switzerland},
journal = {Journal of Pension Economics and Finance},
year = {2023},
volume = {22},
number = {3},
pages = {400--424},
doi = {10.1017/s1474747221000494}
}
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