Kant’s Aesthetics and the Problem of Happiness
Kantian Review · 2020-03 · 25 (1) · 27-51
DOI: 10.1017/s1369415419000451 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Kantian Review, online erschienen am 10.02.2020. Verfasst von Jennifer K. Dobe. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 21 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Kant’s anthropological lectures introduce scepticism about our psychological capacity to experience happiness conceived as gratification or contentment. Aesthetic experience is in a position to inform an alternative conception of happiness that not only is more adequate to the idea of happiness than either gratification or contentment but also may more easily conform to the moral law’s constraints than gratification. As an ‘ideal feeling’, pleasure in beauty serves as a model for how best to enjoy even sensual pleasures and otherwise ‘private’ sensations. In the end, the third Critique suggests that this alternative conception is more ‘appropriate’ to humankind (§60, 5: 355).
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APA
Dobe, J. K. (2020). Kant’s Aesthetics and the Problem of Happiness. Kantian Review, 25(1), 27-51. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415419000451
Vancouver
Dobe JK. Kant’s Aesthetics and the Problem of Happiness. Kantian Review. 2020;25(1):27-51. doi:10.1017/s1369415419000451
BibTeX
@article{Dobe2020,
author = {Dobe, Jennifer K.},
title = {Kant’s Aesthetics and the Problem of Happiness},
journal = {Kantian Review},
year = {2020},
volume = {25},
number = {1},
pages = {27--51},
doi = {10.1017/s1369415419000451}
}
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