No Need to Feel
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics · 2025-10 · 34 (4) · 572-579
DOI: 10.1017/s0963180126100097 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, online erschienen am 11.05.2026. Verfasst von Julio Cabrera. Beteiligte Einrichtung: University of Brasilia, Brazil. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Abortion, Induced. Die Arbeit nennt 6 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article presents five arguments against the idea that non-sentience is a sufficient condition for not considering abortion an immoral act: the formal paradox argument, the third-person argument, the abortionist status argument, the implicit antinatalist premise argument, and the manipulation argument. These five arguments do not disqualify pro-abortion approaches that do not use the element of non-sentience but suggest that it would be appropriate for these approaches to also consider them. The existence of these other pro-abortion arguments shows that non-sentience is not a necessary condition either for trying to show that abortion is not immoral.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- University of Brasilia, Brazil.
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APA
Cabrera, J. (2025). No Need to Feel. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 34(4), 572-579. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0963180126100097
Vancouver
Cabrera J. No Need to Feel. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. 2025;34(4):572-579. doi:10.1017/s0963180126100097
BibTeX
@article{Cabrera2025,
author = {Cabrera, Julio},
title = {No Need to Feel},
journal = {Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics},
year = {2025},
volume = {34},
number = {4},
pages = {572--579},
doi = {10.1017/s0963180126100097}
}
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