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Artificial Moral Responsibility: How We Can and Cannot Hold Machines Responsible

Daniel W Tigard

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics · 2021-07 · 30 (3) · 435-447

DOI: 10.1017/s0963180120000985 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, online erschienen am 10.06.2021. Verfasst von Daniel W Tigard. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Institute for History and Ethics of Medicine, Technical University of Munich, Ismaninger Str. 22 81675Munich, Germany. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Artificial Intelligence, Morals. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 55-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 50 Literaturangaben.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Our ability to locate moral responsibility is often thought to be a necessary condition for conducting morally permissible medical practice, engaging in a just war, and other high-stakes endeavors. Yet, with increasing reliance upon artificially intelligent systems, we may be facing a widening responsibility gap , which, some argue, cannot be bridged by traditional concepts of responsibility. How then, if at all, can we make use of crucial emerging technologies? According to Colin Allen and Wendell Wallach, the advent of so-called ‘artificial moral agents’ (AMAs) is inevitable. Still, this notion may seem to push back the problem, leaving those who have an interest in developing autonomous technology with a dilemma. We may need to scale-back our efforts at deploying AMAs (or at least maintain human oversight); otherwise, we must rapidly and drastically update our moral and legal norms in a way that ensures responsibility for potentially avoidable harms. This paper invokes contemporary accounts of responsibility in order to show how artificially intelligent systems might be held responsible. Although many theorists are concerned enough to develop artificial conceptions of agency or to exploit our present inability to regulate valuable innovations, the proposal here highlights the importance of—and outlines a plausible foundation for—a workable notion of artificial moral responsibility.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Artificial IntelligenceMoralsHumansIntelligenceTechnology

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

AI ethicsartificial intelligenceblamehuman-robot interactionmachine ethicsmoral agencymoral responsibility

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Institute for History and Ethics of Medicine, Technical University of Munich, Ismaninger Str. 22 81675Munich, Germany.

Zitieren

APA

Tigard, D. W. (2021). Artificial Moral Responsibility: How We Can and Cannot Hold Machines Responsible. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 30(3), 435-447. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0963180120000985

Vancouver

Tigard DW. Artificial Moral Responsibility: How We Can and Cannot Hold Machines Responsible. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. 2021;30(3):435-447. doi:10.1017/s0963180120000985

BibTeX
@article{Tigard2021,
  author = {Tigard, Daniel W},
  title = {Artificial Moral Responsibility: How We Can and Cannot Hold Machines Responsible},
  journal = {Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {30},
  number = {3},
  pages = {435--447},
  doi = {10.1017/s0963180120000985}
}
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