Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Those Who Could Have Existed
Utilitas · 2026-09 · 38 (3) · 219-229
DOI: 10.1017/s0953820826100375 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Utilitas, online erschienen am 11.06.2026. Verfasst von David O’Brien. Die Arbeit nennt 14 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Egalitarianism and prioritarianism are competing views about the ethics of distribution. Both views have wide scopes of concern. But, writing in this journal, Michael Otsuka has discovered a case that seems to show an interesting asymmetry between the limits of egalitarian and prioritarian concern. In that case, intuitively one outcome is better than another (in a respect relevant to the ethics of distribution); prioritarianism can recover that intuitive judgment; but egalitarianism seems unable to recover it. I show, however, that egalitarianism can recover the intuitive judgment in question on a well-motivated basis. That result is of interest because it shows the possibility and prima facie plausibility of a version of egalitarianism with a surprisingly wide scope of concern – one according to which it matters that some are worse off than those who (merely) could have existed.
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APA
O’Brien, D. (2026). Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Those Who Could Have Existed. Utilitas, 38(3), 219-229. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820826100375
Vancouver
O’Brien D. Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Those Who Could Have Existed. Utilitas. 2026;38(3):219-229. doi:10.1017/s0953820826100375
BibTeX
@article{OBrien2026,
author = {O’Brien, David},
title = {Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Those Who Could Have Existed},
journal = {Utilitas},
year = {2026},
volume = {38},
number = {3},
pages = {219--229},
doi = {10.1017/s0953820826100375}
}
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