An Actualist Explanation of the Procreation Asymmetry
Utilitas · 2020-03 · 32 (1) · 70-89
DOI: 10.1017/s0953820819000293 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Utilitas, online erschienen am 18.09.2019. Verfasst von Daniel Cohen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 13-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 23 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
While morality prohibits us from creating miserable children, it does not require us to create happy children. I offer an actualist explanation of this apparent asymmetry. Assume that for every possible world W, there is a distinct set of permissibility facts determined by the welfare of those who exist in W. Moral actualism says that actual-world permissibility facts should determine one's choice between worlds. But if one doesn't know which world is actual, one must aim for subjective rightness and maximize expected actual-world permissibility. So, because one should expect actual people to be worse off than they could have been if one creates a miserable child, creating a miserable child is subjectively impermissible. And because one should expect actual people to be at least as well off as they could have been if one fails to create a happy child, failing to create a happy child is subjectively permissible.
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APA
Cohen, D. (2020). An Actualist Explanation of the Procreation Asymmetry. Utilitas, 32(1), 70-89. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820819000293
Vancouver
Cohen D. An Actualist Explanation of the Procreation Asymmetry. Utilitas. 2020;32(1):70-89. doi:10.1017/s0953820819000293
BibTeX
@article{Cohen2020,
author = {Cohen, Daniel},
title = {An Actualist Explanation of the Procreation Asymmetry},
journal = {Utilitas},
year = {2020},
volume = {32},
number = {1},
pages = {70--89},
doi = {10.1017/s0953820819000293}
}
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