Dworkin’s Morality and its Limited Implications for Law
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence · 2012-01 · 25 (1) · 79-95
DOI: 10.1017/s0841820900005348 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, online erschienen am 20.07.2015. Verfasst von Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 27 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In his account of adjudication, Ronald Dworkin makes the case that judicial engagement with morality is a necessary feature of legal practice and so of law itself. This paper examines the nature and implications of this claim. It argues (a) that Dworkin is concerned with a form of engagement between law and morality that is insufficient to make morality count as part of law in virtue of it and (b) that the sort of engagement with morality that Dworkin identifies turns out to support only the notion that judicial acts have moral meaning or import of some sort. Dworkin’s key interpretive claim that adjudication entails offering a positive moral justification for the practice of law is undermined by the type of moral engagement he properly identifies.
Zitieren
APA
Donnelly-Lazarov, B. (2012). Dworkin’s Morality and its Limited Implications for Law. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 25(1), 79-95. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900005348
Vancouver
Donnelly-Lazarov B. Dworkin’s Morality and its Limited Implications for Law. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence. 2012;25(1):79-95. doi:10.1017/s0841820900005348
BibTeX
@article{DonnellyLazarov2012,
author = {Donnelly-Lazarov, Bebhinn},
title = {Dworkin’s Morality and its Limited Implications for Law},
journal = {Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence},
year = {2012},
volume = {25},
number = {1},
pages = {79--95},
doi = {10.1017/s0841820900005348}
}
EUVIMED