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Abstraction as flexibility: the veil of evaluative uncertainty

Carlo Ludovico Cordasco

Economics and Philosophy · 20.04.2026 · 1-23

DOI: 10.1017/s0266267126100728 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economics and Philosophy, online erschienen am 20.04.2026. Verfasst von Carlo Ludovico Cordasco. Die Arbeit nennt 53 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

I argue that evaluative uncertainty gives rational agents instrumental reasons to abstract from some of their salient preferences when bargaining about social institutions. Because agents cannot assume stability in their future evaluative outlook, it is rational to favour rules that preserve options that may become salient. Building on Kreps (1979), I show how flexibility-driven abstraction expands the bargaining set, enabling convergence on rules while preserving motivational continuity. Since options are endogenous, bargainers also have reason to deliberate about option-generating and option-filtering meta-rules that structure the emergence, appraisal and revision of options over time.

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APA

Cordasco, C. L. (2026). Abstraction as flexibility: the veil of evaluative uncertainty. Economics and Philosophy, 1-23. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267126100728

Vancouver

Cordasco CL. Abstraction as flexibility: the veil of evaluative uncertainty. Economics and Philosophy. 2026:1-23. doi:10.1017/s0266267126100728

BibTeX
@article{Cordasco2026,
  author = {Cordasco, Carlo Ludovico},
  title = {Abstraction as flexibility: the veil of evaluative uncertainty},
  journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {1--23},
  doi = {10.1017/s0266267126100728}
}
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